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EMINENT DOMAIN: ATTORNEY FEES IN
CONDEMNATION-A DEFENSE OF THE
PENNSYLVANIA POSITION
INTRODUCTION
In 1971 Pennsylvania took a major step in modernizing its
Eminent Domain Code.' On December 29, of that year, P.L. 84,
the Eminent Domain Code of Pennsylvania, was amended.2 The es-
sence of the new amendments is to add to the Code provisions for
payment of special damages to condemnees defined under the code
as displaced persons. 3 Included in these amendments is a provision
granting to the condemnee reimbursement for reasonable ap-
praisal, attorney, and engineering fees actually incurred; limited in
amount, however, to five hundred dollars. 4 This Comment will
examine the reimbursement provision to the Pennsylvania Emi-
nent Domain Code and compare the Pennsylvania reimbursement
provision with alternative provisions in effect in other jurisdic-
tions.
The term "eminent domain" refers to the power vested in a
sovereign to expropriate private property for public use. 5 A sov-
ereign in American jurisprudence may be either the federal or
state government.6 In Pennsylvania the sovereign is, of course, the
Commonwealth and, in addition, those entities vested with the
power of eminent domain by the laws of the Commonwealth 7
The power of the sovereign to expropriate private property is
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 101-903 (1971):
The Pennsylvania legislation was passed in response to the Federal
Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisitions Act
of 1970 (otherwise known as the Musky Bill) 42 U.S.C. § 4601-4655
(1971). The Federal Act made available federal financial assist-
ance to any state agency which provided necessary lands incident
to a federal public improvement project, provided that that state
implemented legislation compatible with the Federal Act.
2. Id.
3. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 601A, 602A, 603A, 604A, 605A, 606A
(1971).
4. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 610 (1971).
5. See I R. BUSHONG, PENNSYLVANIA LAND LAW 143, 144 (1st ed. 1938);
2 J. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 7 (3d ed. 1971) [hereinafter
cited as NICHOLS]; P. DRUM, THE LAW OF VIEWERS IN PENNSYLVANIA § 101a,
at 142 (Ist ed. 1940); I. LEVEY, CONDEMNATION IN U.S.A. § 1 (Ist ed. 1969)
[hereinafter cited as LEvEY].
6. See generally E. SNITZEH_, PENNSYLVANIA EMINENT DOMAIN § 201-
(3)-1 (1st ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as SNITZER].
7. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 201(3), (5) (1971).
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unique in that it is "not necessarily created either by constitution
or statute, but is an inherent attribute of sovereignty itself."s
Nevertheless, this power is regulated by federal0 and state"° con-
stitutional provisions, which require that the property be expro-
priated for a public use'1 and that just compensation 1 2 be made to
8. Winger v. Aires, 89 A.2d 521, 371 Pa. 242 (1952).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. V, provides in pertinent part:
[N]or [shall any person] be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.
10. PA. CONST. Article 1, Section 10, provides in pertinent part:
(N]or shall private property be taken or applied to public use,
without authority of law and without just compensation being
first made, or secured.
11. See, e.g., Cole v. La Grange, 113 U.S. 1 (1884); Garlapp v. Mis-
sissippi Power Co., 280 Ala. 368, 194 So. 2d 527 (1967); Alaska Gold Re-
covery Co. v. Northern Mining & Trading Co., 7 Alaska 386 (Dist. Ct.
1926), rev'd on other grounds, 20 F.2d 5 (9th Cir. 1927); Cienega Cattle Co.
v. Atkins, 59 Ariz. 287, 126 P.2d 481 (1942); City of Little Rock v. Raines,
241 Ark. 1071, 411 S.W.2d 486 (1967); Sutter County v. Nicols, 152 Cal. 688,
93 P. 872 (1908); Driverless Car Co. v. Armstrong, 91 Colo. 334, 14 P.2d
1098 (1932); Faist Steel Co. v. Bridgeport, 60 Conn. 278, 22 A. 561 (1891);
Clendaniel v. Conrad, 3 Boyce 549, 83 A. 1036 (Del. 1912); Hirsh v. Block,
267 F. 614, 50 App. D.C. 56, rev'd on other grounds, 256 U.S. 135 (1920);
Marvin v. Housing Authority, 133 Fla. 590, 183 So. 145 (1938); Beazley v.
De Kalb County, 210 Ga. 41, 77 S.E.2d 740 (1953); King v. Oahu R.R. &
Land Co., 11 Haw. 717 (1st Cir. Ct. 1899); Bassett v. Swenson, 51 Idaho 256,
5 P.2d 722 (1931); Department of Pub. Works & Bldgs. v. Farina, 29 Ill. 2d
294, 194 N.E. 209 (1963); Kessler v. Indianapolis, 199 Ind. 420, 157 N.E. 547
(1927); Welding Supply Co. v. City of Des Moines, 256 Iowa 973, 129 N.W.2d
666 (1964); Strain v. Cities Service Co., 148 Kan. 393, 83 P.2d 124 (1938);
Bell's Comm. v. Bd. of Educ., 192 Ky. 700, 234 S.W. 311 (1921); Crichton v.
Lee, 209 La. 561, 25 So. 2d 229 (1946); Paine v. Savage, 126 Me. 135 A. 664
(1927); Cannata v. City of New York, 24 Misc. 2d 694, 204 N.Y.S.2d 982
(1960); Lacy v. Montgomery, 181 Pa. Super. 640, 124 A.2d 492 (1956); Weyel
v. Lower Colorado River Authority, 121 S.W.2d 1032 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
12. See, e.g., West v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Baltimore
City, 295 U.S. 662 (1935); Hays v. Inghan-Burnett Lumber Co., 217 Ala. 524,
116 So. 689 (1928); In re Forsstrom, 44 Ariz. 472, 38 P.2d 878 (1934); Young
v. City of Gurdon, 169 Ark. 399, 275 S.W. 890 (1925); City of Oakand v.
Schenck, 197 Cal. 456, 241 P. 545 (1925); San Luis Valley Irr. Dist. v. Hoff-
singer, 85 Colo. 202, 273 P. 827 (1929); Northeastern Gas Transmission Co.
v. Collins, 138 Conn. 582, 87 A.2d 139 (1952); Kittinger v. Rossman, 12
Del. Ch. 276, 112 A. 388 (1921); Bd. of Pub. Instruction of Dade County v.
Town of Bay Harbor Islands, 81 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 1955); State v. Pollitt,
220 Ind. 543, 45 N.E.2d 480 (1942); Prickett v. Belvue Drainage Dist., 159
Kan. 136, 152 P.2d 870 (1944); In re Rodgers, 243 Mich. 517, 220 N.W. 808
(1928); Connor v. Chanhassen Twp., 249 Minn. 205, 81 N.W.2d 789 (1957);
Weinel v. Box Britte County, 108 Neb. 293, 187 N.W. 939 (1922); In re
Northern Boulevard City of New York, 258 N.Y. 136, 179 N.E. 321 (1932);
Lucas v. Carrey, 167 Ohio 416, 149 N.E.2d 238 (1958); Kelly v. Oklahoma
Turnpike Authority, 269 P.2d 359 (Okla. 1954); Northwestern Ice & Coal
Storage Co. v. Multnomach County, 228 Or. 507, 365 P.2d 876 (1961);
Andress v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 410 Pa. 77, 188 A.2d 709 (1963); State
Airport Comm. v. May, 51 R.I. 110, 152 A. 225 (1930); State v. Hale, 136
the owner of the property. This Comment will deal exclusively
with the latter element, and in particular the extent to which at-




The first pronouncements in Pennsylvania for the expropri-
ation of private property came during William Penn's Proprietor-
ship.'3 These pronouncements made no provision for compensation
to the owner of the expropriated property.1 4 It has been suggested
that the failure to provide for compensation was largely due to
the "vast acreage available and the beneficence of William Penn
and other land owners."'" Perhaps due to a decrease in benefi-
cence, later acts, beginning with The Act of November 27, 1700,
provided for compensation to the owners of land expropriated
by the sovereign. 10
In the early days of the settlement of Pennsylvania there ex-
isted, in addition to beneficence, another custom which also had
the effect of ameliorating the consequences of the sovereign's
power of eminent domain. This custom was known at the time as
the Six Per Cent Rule. 17 In the sale of vacant lands by the sov-
ereign, six acres were added without cost for every hundred sold.
These six acres were neither specified nor segregated, but were
merely added to the tract which then totaled one hundred and
six acres. The purpose behind this practice was that whenever the
sovereign deemed necessary the construction of a public road
through any territory, it could be effected by simply repossessing
the gratuitous acreage.ls The shortcomings of this system are
easy to imagine and its prevalence was short-lived.' 9
The first constitutional guarantee to the citizens of the Com-
monwealth that private property could not be expropriated "with-
out just compensation" came with the adoption of the Pennsyl-
vania Constitution of 1790.20 And every constitution enacted by
Tex. 29, 146 S.W.2d 731 (1941); State Highway Comm. v. Crockett, 203 Va.
796, 127 S.E.2d 354 (1962); Hogue v. Port of Seattle, 54 Wash. 2d 799,
341 P.2d 117 (1959).
13. See P. Lewis, Eminent Domain in Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 26, at 6-7 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Lewis], citing Duke of Yorkes'
Book of Laws, 95.
14. Lewis, supra note 13, at 8.
15. Id.
16. Act of November 27, 1700, 2 Stat. 118 ch. 88, § 3 [Pa. 1700] (re-
pealed 1705).
17. Lewis, supra note 13 at 16.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 17, 18.




the Legislature since 1790 has included a similar provision.
21
B. Just Compensation
Just compensation22 from the conceptual viewpoint of reim-
bursement has been defined as that compensation which will put
the owner of property taken in as "good position pecuniarily as he
would have occupied if his property had not been taken." 2  In
practical terms this generally means:
The compensation to be awarded . . . is the amount
that in all probability would have been arrived at by fair
negotiation between an owner willing to sell and a pur-
chaser desiring to buy, and in making that estimate, there
should be taken into account all considerations that fairly
might be brought forward and reasonably be given sub-
stantial weight in such bargaining.
24
Thus, in the context of this Comment the question may be stated:
If the condemnee had not incurred attorney fees but for the con-
demnation, 25 and if he is to be put in a position as though his prop-
erty had not been taken, are his attorney fees thereby included
in just compensation? 26 To Illustrate this question, suppose the
following facts: A is the owner of Blackacre which the Pennsyl-
vania Department of Transportation, an entity which has acquired
the power of eminent domain under the laws of the Common-
wealth,2 7 condemns in its entirety for a proper purpose. Sup-
pose further, that the Commonwealth through its condemning
agency offers A $50,000.00 for his property. A, who has received
[N]or shall private property be taken or applied to public use
without the consent of his representatives, and without just com-
pensation being made.
21. PA. CONST. of 1783, Art. I, § 10 (1783), provides in pertinent
part:
[N]or shall private property be taken or applied to public use
without the consent of his representatives, and without just com-
pensation being made.
PA. CONST. of 1874, Art. I, § 10 (1874), provides in pertinent part:
[N]or shall private property be taken or applied to public use,
without authority of law and without just compensation being
made or secured.
22. See generally 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 97 (1965). See
also cases cited note 11 supra.
23. 2,953.15 Acres of Land, more or less, in Russell County, State of
Alabama v. United States, 350 F.2d 356 (4th Cir. 1965).I 24. ' United States v. 243.22 Acres of Land Situated in Village of Farm-
ingdale, Town of Babylon, Suffolk County, 48 F. Supp. 177 (E.D.N.Y.
1942).
25. See generally C. McCORMICK, DAMAGES § 60 at 234 (lst ed. 1935)
[hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK].
26. See text accompanying notes 46-50 infra.
27. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 201(3) (1964).
several offers from other interested buyers substantially greater
than the Commonwealth's offer, is convinced the value of his land
is far in excess of the Commonwealth's offer. Perplexed, A con-
sults an attorney whose opinion is in concert with his own. In re-,
fusing the Commonwealth's last offer of $60,000.00, the controversy
is settled in court where A is awarded a $100,000 verdict which is af-
firmed on appeal. To prove his case, A has incurred $15,000 rea-
sonable expenses for attorney fees and related expenses. May A
recover his $15,000 expenses in addition to his $100,000.00? By
the overwhelming weight of authority in this country the answer
is no.28 In summation of this general conclusion it has been stated:
The costs recoverable in eminent domain proceedings
include only the usual court costs, and the owner is not
made whole for the expense he is put to in asserting his
right to compensation. Under the ordinary statute costs
do not include counsel fees .... 21
Several states permit recovery in limited instances. 30 A majority
of the states, however, fail to have any statutory authority at
all regarding reimbursement of attorney fees.31 Of the states
which take a position on this issue, several different procedures
are employed. In order to better evaluate them we shall first
examine the Pennsylvania procedure for the reimbursement of at-
torney fees in eminent domain proceedings.
III. REIMBURSEMENT OF ATTORNEY FEES AND RELATED FEES IN
EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEEDINGS IN PENNSYLVANIA
Prior to the enactment of section 610 of the Pennsylvania
Eminent Domain Code in 1971,32 Pennsylvania law failed to pro-
vide for the reimbursement of attorney fees in the normal con-
demnation proceeding. Pennsylvania law did provide, however,
for the reimbursement of such fees in three exceptional situations.
These three situations, sections 406(e), 408, and 609, 23 under which
attorney fees were entirely recoverable by the condemnee, have
been continued as exceptions to the newly enacted section 610
and will be analyzed in great detail in the discussion which follows.
Newly enacted section 61034 of the Pennsylvania Eminent Do-
main Code, entitled "Limited Reimbursements of Appraisal, Attor-
ney, and Engineering Fees," provides:
28. See generally NICHOLS, supra note 5, § 4.109 at 532.
29. NICHOLS, supra note 5, § 8.64 at 538.
30. See text accompanying notes 65-72 infra.
31. See Hearings on S. 1351 Before the Subcom. on Improvements in
Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d
Sess. at 57 (1968), where it is indicated in Appendix III that 34 states have
no legislation on attorney fees in eminent domain proceedings.
32. McQuade v. Richland Water Co., 39 Pa. C.C. 587 (1912).
33. PA. STAT. A.N. tit. 26, § 406(e), 408, 609 (1971).
34. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 610 (1971).
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The owner of any right, title, or interest in real prop-
erty acquired or injured by an acquiring agency, who is
not eligible for reimbursement of such fees under sections
406(e), 408, or 609 of this Act, shall be reimbursed in an
amount not to exceed five hundred dollars ($500.00) as a
payment toward reasonable expenses actually incurred
for appraisal, attorney and engineering fees.33
Thus, save the exceptions, noted as sections 406 (e), 408 and 609,
the condemnor in a Pennsylvania eminent domain proceeding must
reimburse the condemnee for reasonable appraisal, attorney and
engineering fees actually incurred in an amount not to exceed
five hundred dollars.
The exceptions to section 610, under which a condemnee may
recover his attorney fees and related expenses in their entirety,
generally pertain to those situations in which the condemnor relin-
quishes the condemned property, either by force of law or volun-
tarily, within one year from the date of filing a declaration of taking,
or has failed to comply with the statutory requirement that no-
tice of the declaration of taking be promptly filed.36 Thus, sec-
tion 408 provides that:
The condemnor, by filing a declaration of relinquish-
ment in court within one year from the filing of the decla-
ration of taking . . . [and the] condemned property is re-
linquished, the condemnee shall be reimbursed by the con-
demnor for reasonable appraisal, attorney and engineering
fees and other costs and expenses actually incurred because
of the condemnation proceedings.
37
Just as section 408 pertains to the condemnor's voluntary relin-
quishment of the condemnee's property and provides compensa-
tion for the condemnee's reasonable expenses therefor, likewise, sec-
tion 406(e) provides the same measure of compensation when the
condemnor subsequent to filing a declaration to taking is forced
by operation of law to relinquish the condemnee's property.38
Section 406(e) provides for full compensation of reasonable ap-
praisal, attorney, and engineering fees where, "preliminary objec-
tions are finally sustained which have the effect of finally termi-
nating the condemnation."3 9  Finally, section 609 'provides that
where the condemnor has expropriated property anywhere in the
Commonwealth and has failed to file a declaration of taking "a
judgment awarding compensation to the condemnee for the taking
35. Id.
36. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 406(e), 408, 609 (1971).
37. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 408 (1964).
38. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 406(e) (1964).
39. Id.
of the property shall include reimbursement of reasonable ap-
praisal, attorney, and engineering fees and other costs and ex-
penses actually incurred."
40
In sum, under the present Pennsylvania Eminent Domain
Code, the condemnee will receive some reimbursement for his rea-
sonable attorney fees and related expenses actually incurred. If the
expropriation is improper, as defined under sections 406(e), 408 and
609, the condemnee is fully compensated for these expenses. If, on
the other hand, the expropriation is deemed proper, the condemnee
will receive an amount not to exceed $500.00 for the reasonable ex-
penditure actually incurred for attorney fees and related expenses.
The following examples should clarify this latter payment.
Suppose in the following hypothetical that the condemnation
is proper. Nevertheless, the condemnee contests the sufficiency
of the condemnor's offer and the controversy is resolved in the
trial court which finds the condemnor's offer sufficient, and where
the condemnee thereby incurs the following expenses which the
court determines are reasonable:
appraisal fee - $100.00
attorney fee - 200.00
engineer fee - 125.00
Total $425.00
Under section 610, regardless of a finding of damages, the con-
demnee will receive the full amount of expenses or $425.00.
41
Now suppose in our next example that the trial court finds
the condemnor's offer insufficient by several thousand dollars. In
addition, the court finds the following expenditures reasonable:
appraisal fees - $ 500.00
attorney fees - 1000.00
engineer fees - 200.00
Total $1700.00
Since the limit on recovery is $500.00 under section 610, regard-
less of the fact that the condemnor's offer was insufficient and
the condemnee was compelled by the exigencies of the circum-
stances to seek a proper recovery in a court of law, the condemnee
will recover $500.00 toward the payment of his reasonable attorney
fees and related expenses.
42
The Pennsylvania statutory procedure for determining just
compensation in eminent domain proceedings with respect to attor-
ney fees and related expenses we shall label for comparison pur-
40. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 609 (1964).
41. The fact that attorney fees are recoverable (up to $500.00) re-
gardless of whether the case is taken to court is peculiar to Pennsylvania.
This will be most significant in the forthcoming discussion of the various
statutory procedures in effect in other jurisdictions.
42. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 610 (1971).
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poses the statutory limit recovery.43 As noted earlier there are
several alternative statutory procedures currently in effect in other
jurisdictions.44 An analysis of the merits and demerits of the
Pennsylvania procedure follows an analysis of these alterna-
tive statutory procedures.
IV. APPROACHES TO THE REIMBURSEMENT OF ATTORNEY FEES AND
RELATED EXPENSES IN EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEEDINGS
A. Full Reimbursement
In recent years there has been increased support for the prop-
osition that attorney fees be included in just compensation awards
in eminent domain proceedings. 45 Notwithstanding this fact, only
one state, Florida, has statutory authority which provides for the
complete reimbursement of reasonable attorney fees incurred in
eminent domain proceedings.
46
The pertinent Florida statute provides that:
The petitioner shall pay all reasonable costs of the pro-
ceedings in the circuit court, including a reasonable attor-
neys' fee to be assessed by the court.
47
In addition, however, the Florida Supreme Court has indicated
that even without statutory authority, it would still permit recovery
of attorney fees,48 adding that failure to do so "would fall far short
of a practical attempt to make the owner whole." 49
The rationale behind the full recovery of attorney fees in emi-
nent domain proceedings is generally based on two propositions.
The first proposition is that there is an unequal bargaining position
between the federal or state government (condemnor) and the
owner of the expropriated property (condemnee). 5 The second is
that the condemnation of private property forces the owner to in-
cur expenses in asserting his right to compensation and a failure
to reimburse for such expenses would be a taking of property
without just compensation.5 1
43. See notes 73-78 and accompanying text infra.
44. See note 33 supra.
45. Note, Attorneys' Fees in Condemnation Proceedings, 20 HAST. L.J.
694 (1969); D. Foerster, A Look at Condemnation Attorneys' Fees, 46 FLA.
B.J. 130 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Foerster].
46. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 73.091 (1965).
47. Id.
48. Jacksonville Expressway Authority v. Dupree, 108 So. 2d 289
(Fla. 1959).
49. Id. at 294.
50. See generally Foerster, supra note 46, at 131.
51. LEVEY, supra note 5, § 47 at 464.
Regarding the first proposition, no one familiar with real es-
tate appraising would deny that two honest appraisers may reach
significantly different conclusions as to the value of a given piece
of property. The myriad factors which must be taken into account
in a proper estimate, such as business loss, severance, highest and
best use, comparative sales and many others, give some indication
why this should be S0.52 The government with its resources
has the capability of employing a staff of attorneys, appraisers,
and engineers in order to determine in accordance with its own
standards a value for the property in question, as well as the ca-
pacity to marshall these experts, should litigation prove necessary.
The private citizen, taken unawares by the condemnation, gener-
ally speaking, is unable to properly judge the adequacy of the
government's offer, especially in light of the complex factors
which must be considered. "- If real estate appraising were an ex-
act science or if one were convinced of the sanctity of the acquir-
ing agency's judgment, there would be no need to challenge the
offer for the property. Experience, however, appears to negative
both contentions. Real estate appraising is an opinion, and like
all opinions achieves little distinction if it is the only one heard. In
similar fashion, the good faith of the condemnee has been drama-
tically attacked by a published report on New York's eminent do-
main procedures called "The Nassau County Study. '5 4 In this
study it was empirically demonstrated that, despite New York's con-
stitutional guarantee of "just compensation," the county's negoti-
ators were instructed to settle at amounts which the authors con-
cluded were not to exceed 60% to 85% of the county's lower apprais-
al. 5  The common fact that appraisers may honestly differ by
substantial margins alone justifies the condemnee's need to be rep-
resented by counsel. The disconcerting fact that the condemnor
may seek to acquire the property for less than its market value,
perhaps in a misguided effort to save taxpayers money, is proof
positive of this need. Thus, without counsel to consult as to the
factors to be considered in deciding fair market value, and with-
out an independent appraisal figure to gage the sufficiency of the
government's offer, the condemnee is indeed in an unequal bargain-
ing position.
Regarding the second proposition the argument is made that if
the condemnee's attorney is, in fact, necessary to a proper deter-
mination of just compensation, the condemnee will fail to receive
just compensation when from his award, which by definition is
52. For a list of these factors see- PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 601," 602,
603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 610.1, 611, 612, 613, 601A, 603A, 604A,
605A.
53. See note 33 supra.
54. Berger and Rohan, The Nassau County Studies-An Empirical
Look into the Practices of Condemnation, 67 COL. L. REV. 430 (1967).
55. Id. at 445.
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just compensation, he must subtract his attorney fees and related
expenses. This contradiction becomes more dramatic when it was
only through the efforts of his counsel that the condemnee received
his constitutionally guaranteed just compensation. Early recogni-
tion of this apparent contradiction was demonstrated in an 1895
New York decision, City of Brooklyn v. Long Island Water-Supply
Co.,'" where the court stated:
A person or a corporation, whose property is sought to
be taken under condemnation proceedings, is entitled to
be heard at every step of the process, and in justice
should be compensated not only for the land or property
taken, but should be indemnified against all costs and ex-
penses reasonably incurred either in resisting the appro-
priation or in the proceeding for ascertaining the compen-
sation to be made.
5 7
In effect, the supporters of full attorney fee reimbursement
contend that failure to fully reimburse the condemnee for these
expenditures violates the constitutional requirement of just com-
pensation. At first blush, there is much appeal to the full reim-
bursement argument. However, it is submitted that it suffers from
a substantial weakness in its encouragement of litigation. A prime
consideration in determining whether to reject a condemnor's of-
fer and go to court would generally be the expense of the suit as
compared with the chance for success. If the cost of litigation is
borne by the condemnor, the choice of whether to go to court is
remarkably simplified because the condemnee has virtually noth-
ing to lose and everything to gain. Conversely, the advocates of
full recovery posit the proposition that reimbursement of attorney
fees will actually lessen litigation.58 Their argument is that by
dealing with a more informed condemnee, which he will most
certainly be after obtaining counsel, the condemnor will of neces-
sity become more forthright and more susceptible to compromise
and settlement.59 Absent empirical proof, one is left to proceed
upon one's own view of human nature. It is submitted, however,
that an informed condemnee who needn't be concerned with the
costs of trial nor his attorney fee is more prone to litigate. Those
states which have recognized a need to reimburse attorney fees,
but have at the same instant also recognized the concomitant in-
centive to litigate, offer an intriguing resolution.60 A discussion of
this procedure follows.
56. 148 N.Y. 107, 42 N.E. 413 (1895).
57. Id. at 109, 42 N.E. at 413.
58. See Foerster, supra note 45, at 131.
59. Id.
60. See notes 62-65 and accompanying text infra.
B. Attorney Fees Reimbursed When Trial Court Verdict Exceeds
the Condemnor's Last Offer
Two states have statutory provisions whereby the condemnor
must pay attorney fees and related expenses when the trial award
exceeds the condemnor's last offer. 6' The reasoning behind this
statutory scheme is simple. Since the trial award is just com-
pensation, if the condemnor's offer was less, it was by definition
less than just compensation. Therefore, the condemnee should
not be penalized (by having his attorney fees subtracted from his
award) for proving what he constitutionally deserved in the first
instance. Conversely, if the trial court's award is equal to or less
than the condemnor's offer, then the condemnee is required to pay
his expenses to atone for the frivolity of his suit.
This reimbursement procedure is identical to that which is pro-
posed by a tentative draft of the Model Eminent Domain Code pre-
pared by the Committee on Condemnation Law of the Real Prop-
erty, Probate and Trust Section of the American Bar Association.62
Although the tentative draft of the Model Eminent Domain Code
was first published in 1967, the support for this position has been
minor."3 The reason for this is not surprising.
This procedure, by its very nature, provides for reimburse-
ment of attorney fees only when the controversy is resolved in
court.64 If the condemnee secures legal advice as well as a pro-
fessional appraisal, on the basis of which he decides to accept the
condemnor's offer and eschew a court battle, he must pay for
those expenses out of his "just compensation."
C. Full Recovery When Condemnor Relinquishes the Condemned
Property
Approximately one fourth of the states provide for reimburse-
ment of attorney fees and related expenses when the condemning
authority relinquishes the property following condemnation."
61. IOWA CODE § 472.33 (1966).
The applicant shall pay all costs of the assessment made by
the commissioners and reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred
by the condemnee as determined by the commissioners if the
award of the commissioners exceeds one hundred ten per cent of
the trial offer of the applicant prior to condemnation.
OREGON REv. STAT. § 35.345:
The costs and disbursements of the defendant, including a rea-
sonable attorney fee and reasonable expenses . .. shall be ...
recovered from the condemner unless the condemner tendered the
defendant, before commencing the action, an amount equal to or
greater than that assessed by the jury.
62. 2 A.B.A_ REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE AND TRUST, § 504(E) (1967).
63. See note 61 supra.
64. An examination of the Iowa and Oregon Statutes cited at note 61
supra, demonstrates this fact.
65. Alabama, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Iowa, Maryland, Mich-
gan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Da-
kjota, Ohio, South Carolina.
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The Pennsylvania Eminent Domain Code, as noted earlier, has a
similar provision. 6  One possible rationale for this procedure is ex-
pressed in Los Angelese v. Abbott,6 7 where the California Supreme
Court stated that in the absence of such a provision the possibility
existed whereby the condemnor, if dissatisfied with a particular
jury verdict, could "abandon the action, pay the nominal costs, re-
try the action, and repeat this process until a satisfactory award
was arrived at."'68 The official comment to the applicable Pennsyl-
vania Statute, justifies full reimbursement following relinquish-
ment simply because the condemnee's land has been "tied up."6 9
However, the explanation which sounds most in concert with prin-
ciples of damages was noted in a Pennsylvania case, Baker v. De-
trich,70 where the superior court stated in support of its decision
to include in the condemnee's verdict his reasonable counsel fee:
The allowance should be limited to such a sum as
would restore the defendants as far as possible to the po-
sition in which they were at the commencement of the
proceeding to terminate .... 71
Principles of equity and good conscience would appear to com-
mend this provision. The condemnee has suffered a significant
disruption, for which reason the subsequent relinquishment reveals
to be wanting. To make him whole should be the desired goal un-
der such circumstances.
D. Statutory Limit Reimbursement
The statutory limit reimbursement procedure provides for
the recovery of reasonable attorney fees and related expenses with
the added provision that the recovery not exceed a predetermined
statutory limit.72 To date Pennsylvania is the only state which
has adopted this particular statutory scheme. The rationale be-
hind this statutory scheme is generally one of compromise. First,
there is a recognition of the frequently unequal bargaining posi-
tion between the condemnor and the condemnee.73 By providing
for some reimbursement, the condemnee is encouraged to retain
counsel and profit by his advice. In addition, in Pennsylvania, not
only are attorney fees covered by this statute, but so too are ap-
66. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 408 (1964).
67. 217 Cal. 184, 17 P.2d 993 (1932).
68. Id. at 200, 17 P.2d at 998.
69. See Official Comment to PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 408 (1964).
70. 85 Pa. Super. 202 (1925).
71. Id. at 205.
72. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 610 (1971).
73. See notes 53-56 and accompanying text supra.
praisal and engineering fees up to $500.00.14 Thus, the condemnee
is extended every opportunity to obtain preliminary advice in or-
der to form an educated opinion with regard to the propriety of
the condemnation itself, as well as the sufficiency of the condemn-
or's offer. These expenses the condemnee may recover regardless
of whether the matter is taken to court, and regardless of the ver-
dict, should he go to court.7 5 Since the recovery is by definition
limited, the condemnee must make his decision whether to litigate
on the sole issue of his estimate of success based upon his view
of the evidence.
It is also argued that the statutory limitation of reimbursement
of attorney fees and related expenses encourages settlements. One
reason for this argument is based upon the observation of eminent
domain litigation under prior Pennsylvania law. Under that
statutory scheme, in which attorney fees were not compensated,
when a condemnee did obtain an attorney, frequently he demanded
additional compensation hoping to defray his attorney expenses
thereby. Thus, it is argued that many times condemnation mat-
ters were litigated over exiguous amounts for the disguised motive
of covering attorney fees.
By the same token and most significantly, it is also argued
that this procedure for limited reimbursement will encourage settle-
ment for additional reasons. Where the monetary difference be-
tween the condemnor and the condemnee over just compensation
is small or the amount of the controversy is small in nature, the
condemnor will be more susceptible to compromise when he knows
that the condemnee, fortified by having his expenses compensated,
at least to the statutory amount, cannot be intimidated into shun-




By far most states fail to provide any statutory procedure
for the reimbursement of attorney fees and related expenses in
eminent domain proceedings.77  This position is in keeping with
the tradition in this country where, in the main, counsel fees and
expenses of suit are not recoverable, but are sustained by the per-
son who incurs them.78
The English practice is altogether different.79 There the costs
74. See note 36 and accompanying text supra.
75. Pennsylvania is the only state which provides for attorney fees
reimbursement even when the case is settled out of court.
76. See note 77 infra. This point is noted for comparison purposes
with other statutory recovery schemes which reimburse attorney fees only
when the case is taken to court. See the Florida Statute note 48 supra.
77. McComcx, supra note 25, § 60 at 234.




recoverable by the successful party to an action include the rea-
sonable expense incurred for counsel fees 80 Following the co-
lonial period, the courts of this country, with few exceptions,81
ruled that no attorney fees may be awarded except those provided
by statute.8 2  The reasoning for this position was that to impose
such penalties upon the loser would serve to inhibit access to the
courts.8 3 Another argument was that the assessment of counsel
fees was an additional burden placed upon the court which may
well serve to prolong the original cause.84 Nevertheless, the fact
that state legislatures have sought in very few instances to change
by statute the traditional American approach to the recovery of
attorney fees bespeaks the uniqueness with which eminent domain
is considered in the American system of jurisprudence.
It is submitted that the reasons for these statutory changes
regarding reimbursement of attorney fees and related expenses in
eminent domain proceedings can be found in those reasons sub-
mitted in the advancement of each of the aforementioned statu-
tory schemes which advocate some form of reimbursement. Some
are reasons of logic, most are reasons of public policy. The choice,
it should be noted, however, is not just among those schemes which
provide for some form of attorney fee reimbursement, but also
whether there should be reimbursement at all.
V. CONCLUSION
It is submitted that the adversary system will best insure just
compensation for the condemnee. Furthermore, legal advice at
every step in the condemnation will insure the best adversary
system. Therefore, it is submitted that that policy which encour-
ages the condemnee to obtain counsel will best insure the goal of
just compensation. To secure that policy, the condemnor should
reimburse (if only conditionally) the condemnee for his attorney
fees and related expenses.
Once it has been determined that just compensation requires
some form of attorney fee reimbursement, there remains the ques-
tion of the best form that reimbursement should take. It is sub-
mitted that the statutory limit recovery procedure as enacted in
80. Id.
81. Divorce proceedings is a prime example. See, e.g., Ortrnan v.
Ortman, 203 Ala. 167, 82 So. 417 (1919); Walker v. Walker, 190 Cal. 575,
213 P. 967 (1923); Crane v. Crane, 128 Md. 214, 97 A. 535 (1916).
82. MCCORMICK, supra note 25, § 60 at 235-36.
83. Id.
84. Id.
Pennsylvania, coupled with the full recovery where the condemnor
relinquishes the condemned property is best. In deciding this is-
sue, the following factors should be determinative: (1) That
which will encourage retention of counsel; (2) That which will
encourage settlement and compromise; and (3) That which will
not encourage litigation. The no recovery procedure forces settle-
ment by intimidation, especially in small claim controversies, and
patently fails to encourage retention of counsel. The full recovery
procedure encourages retention of counsel but also seems to en-
courage litigation by relieving the condemnee of any financial
burden regarding the litigation. The full recovery when the
trial court's verdict exceeds the condemnor's last offer is more rea-
sonable but will penalize a good faith effort to challenge the suffi-
ciency of the condemnor's offer when the verdict is equal to or less
than the condemnor's last offer. Most notably, this procedure will
only pay counsel fees when they grow out of a law suit.
It is submitted that, on the average, the statutory limit recovery
of attorney fees and related expenses best achieves the stated
goals. First, it guarantees reimbursement of attorney fees up to a
particular limit and thereby encourages retention of counsel
whether the case goes to court or not. Second, it encourages set-
tlement by producing a more informed condemnee and, indirectly,
a condemnor less recalcitrant to compromise. Third, it will not
encourage litigation because after the statutory limit is exhausted,
the condemnee must pay for his additional expenses from his own
resources.
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